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Abstract
Recent research has suggested that natural selection in ﬁnancial markets may be a very
slow process, taking hundreds of years. We show in a general equilibrium model that it
may be much faster in markets with large state spaces. In many cases, the time it takes to
wipe out irrational investors is inversely proportional to the number of stocks in the market,
i.e., if it takes about 500 years with one stock, it takes about one year with 500 stocks.
Thus, theoretically, natural selection can be very eﬃcient even when there is high market
uncertainty. The speed of the natural selection process is a known function of irrational
investors’ sentiment and of the real characteristics of the stock market. According to a
calibration to U.S. stock data, it takes about ﬁfty years for an irrational investor to be wiped
out. This is in line with studies of individual investor underperformance.
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643-1420.1 Introduction
The idea of natural selection, that rational investors will outperform irrational investors and
eventually dominate the market, dates back to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953). However,
although the idea is simple and intuitive, it has been shown to be false under several conditions.
Over-optimistic investors may invest a larger share of their wealth in risky assets and ultimately
dominate the market when prices are set exogenously (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Wald-
man, 1990; Blume and Easley, 1992). Similarly, irrational investors with a lower consumption-
to-savings ratio than rational investors may dominate the market. Moreover, even when rational
investors eventually dominate the market measured by fraction of wealth, irrational investors
may still have nonnegligible impact on prices (Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerﬁeld, 2006).
However, when rational and irrational investors have identical utilities, natural selection will
occur except under special conditions. In general equilibrium with complete markets, Sandroni
(2000) shows that rational investors will eventually dominate the market under general condi-
tions if agents have identical intertemporal discount factors (although Blume and Easley 2006
recently showed that in incomplete markets, this result may not hold). Loewenstein and Willard
(2006) point out that models of the type of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990)
implicitly have to allow for real transfers of production (between risk-less storage and risky
technology) and for changes in aggregate consumption.
An important quantitative question in markets where natural selection occurs is: How long
will it take to wipe out irrational investors? The answer to this question is crucial to our
understanding of stock markets. If it takes a limited amount of time, say less than a decade,
this may warrant a rational equilibrium view of the stock market. Rational equilibrium pricing
prevail most of the time, except for in periods of temporary disequilibrium. If, on the other
hand, it takes hundreds of years to wipe out irrational investors, the correct model must be one
of disequilibrium pricing.
A recent strand of research suggests that the natural selection process may be very slow.
Building on the general equilibrium literature with heterogeneous investors (see, e.g., Detemple
and Murthy 1994 and Basak 2000), Yan (2006) analyzes a Lucas model with one risky and one
risk-free asset, and shows that it may take several hundred years before a rational representative
investor dominates an irrational one. Similar results are derived in Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal
(2005), under slightly diﬀerent assumptions, and used in Branger, Schlag, and Wu (2006).
A slow selection process is somewhat alarming for believers in rational asset pricing theory.
1Moreover, it does not ﬁt well with studies documenting underperformance by unsophisticated
investors in the market. For example, individual investors in the study by Barber, Lee, Liu,
and Odean (2005) underperform institutional investors by about 2.1% per year, which implies
a 50% underperformance in a 30-year horizon. Therefore, the quantitative question may not be
adequately addressed by current theoretical models.
One property of these current models is that they are based on severely restricted state
spaces, i.e., they have only one stock and one bond. One may ask if the results would change
in a more realistic model, with a large state space (e.g., with many stocks). Of course, in
conventional ﬁnance theory, with one single representative investor, little is changed by taking
into consideration additional states beyond what is spanned by the market portfolio. However,
the situation is diﬀerent when agents disagree and there is no-longer a representative investor.
What might change in a richer model with respect to the speed of natural selection? A priori
this is not clear. On the one hand, one could argue that if it is diﬃcult to take advantage of
irrational traders quickly in a simpliﬁed model of the stock market, it must be almost impossible
in a more complex market, where the irrationality is spread out over a huge state space. On
the other hand, one could argue that it is exactly in complex markets that rationality will pay
oﬀ, as a larger state space allows rational investors to separate their strategies from irrational
traders to a higher degree.
In this paper we show that the latter intuition is correct, and that natural selection may
indeed be a much faster process than that suggested by models with only one risky asset. The
intuition is simple: Consider a one-factor model with multiple ﬁrms, in which irrational investors
are slightly bullish about the prospects of half of the ﬁrms and slightly bearish about the other
half, leading to slight overpricing in half of the stocks and underpricing in the other half. The
natural arbitrage strategy for a rational investor in this case is to form a long-short portfolio,
eliminating all the market risk and almost all the idiosyncratic risk. Thereby, the investor
obtains a slight excess return with almost no risk. The reason why the ﬁrst intuition fails is
that the rational investors have no need to “ﬁnd” the markets in which the irrational investors
are trading. The irrational traders’ sentiments are automatically revealed by the prices of the
diﬀerent assets.
The main contribution of this paper is to formalize this idea in a general equilibrium frame-
work and study its implications for the speed of natural selection. We call this speed the market’s
arbitrageability,1 and we show that it can be conveniently measured in our model. We study
1There are never pure arbitrage opportunities in our economy, but the arbitrageability quantiﬁes how “close”
2a simpliﬁed model of value creation compared with the standard Lucas model. Our economy
is observationally equivalent to a Lucas economy with a modiﬁed value processes. Under quite
general conditions, the time it takes to wipe out irrational investors is inversely proportional to
the number of stocks. For example, if it takes 500 years in a market with one stock, it takes
less than one year in a market, with the same market Sharpe ratio, but with 500 stocks. Thus,
although the model with one risky asset qualitatively gives the same result as the multi-asset
model (extinction of irrational traders), the quantitative diﬀerence is striking. This result is
robust to various assumptions about the sentiments of irrational investors and the structure of
the stock market. The only cases for which the natural selection process is not faster is when
there is no spread of investor sentiment across stocks, or when stock returns are uncorrelated.
In these cases, the model collapses to the one stock model.
A second contribution of this paper is to calibrate the model to U.S. stock data, and estimate
the arbitrageability of the market. Under the ideal conditions of the theoretical model, trading in
the S&P 500 universe is extremely hazardous for unsophisticated investors. At the other extreme,
with eﬀectively only one stock, prices are informationally quite ineﬃcient, as sentiment investors
inﬂuence prices for a long time. Our simple calibration points to somewhere in-between. The
time it takes to wipe out irrational investors is about ﬁfty years, in line with studies of individual
investor behavior in the stock market (Barber and Odean, 2001; Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean,
2005).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. For ex-
positional reasons we begin with a one-stock, one representative agent set-up, which we then
generalize to multiple stocks and two agents. We then derive the results for the speed of the
natural selection process in Section 3. In Section 4, we do a simple calibration of the model to
the U.S. stock market. Finally, in Section 5, we make some concluding remarks. Details and
proofs are left to the appendix.
2 The model
2.1 One stock and one investor
For expositional simplicity, we ﬁrst study the case with one stock and inﬁnitely lived represen-
tative investor with time-separable log utility. This case will show how the general equilibrium
set-up works and we will subsequently use it for comparison with the multi-stock, multi-investor
the economy is to allowing pure arbitrage.
3results.
In a standard manner, we assume a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,Ft,P)a n da nFt-adapted
standard Brownian motion Bt, satisfying the usual conditions. The instantaneous return of
investing in the stock at price P is:
˜ μ = μF
t dt + σF











Here g and σ are exogenously given functions, Pt is the stock price at time t, ct is the instanta-
neous consumption per unit time, which is equal to the ﬁrm’s production, and Bt is a standard
Brownian motion. In the appendix we give a motivation for such a stochastic return process
using a simple production economy. Unless stated, all processes are assumed to be Ft-adapted.
Moreover, all conditions are assumed to hold almost surely.







There is also a risk-free bond available in zero net supply, oﬀering an instantaneously risk-free
interest rate of rt. For notational compactness we suppress dependencies when obvious, e.g.,
writing r instead of rt for interest rates, etc. The investors wealth, Wt then satisﬁes the stochastic
process:
dWt = −ctdt + Wt

rdt+ αt(μFdt + σFdBt − rdt)

, (3)
where αt is the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset at time t. W em a k et h en a t u r a l
restriction to only consider feasible investment strategies, i.e., strategies for which Wt ≥ 0.
The consumption market, per deﬁnition, clears at each point in time. An equilibrium can
therefore be described by the following three conditions: At each point in time








, subject to (3),
2. The demand for the risk-free asset is zero: Wt = Pt,
3. The stock market clears: αtWt = Pt, (i.e. — by 2. — αt =1 ) .
4The following proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium in this economy:






dt + σ(ct)dBt, (4)






t h ep r i c ei sPt = Wt, and the instantaneous consumption is ct = ρWt.
In the standard Lucas set-up, g and σ are linear in ct. We deviate from this set-up by
assuming that g and σ are constants. This leads to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for wealth.2
The deviation is needed for us to be able to solve for the case with multiple stocks. The reason is
that the dynamic systems become prohibitively diﬃcult to solve in the standard set-up: With N
stocks, the general equilibrium formulation leads to a system of N coupled non-linear parabolic
PDEs. Only in special cases can the solution be found.3 We shall see that only relative wealth
levels of diﬀerent investor groups are important for the speed of the natural selection process,
so this is no major restriction. This should come as no surprise as investors have logarithmic
utility, so the total wealth level is obviously unimportant.
Thus, in our set-up, wealth and price oscillate around the steady state wealth level ¯ W = g/ρ
and the corresponding consumption ¯ c = g, depending on the realization of the real economy.
Using the relation ¯ W = g/ρ, it is easy to see that the steady-state interest rate is ¯ r = ρ−ρ2σ2/g2
and the steady state Sharpe ratio is ¯ S = ρσ/g.
For subsequent comparison, we introduce a numerical example: An intertemporal discount
factor of ρ = 10%, value creation drift of g = 1 and volatility σ = 2 lead to the following steady
state solution ¯ W = ¯ P = 10, ¯ r = 6%, and a steady state Sharpe ratio of ¯ S =0 .2.
2For very low levels of ct, we assume that σ(ct) decreases to zero, to ensure that wealth always is strictly
positive. For example, we can assume that σ(ct)=σ,f o rct ≥   and σ(ct)=ctσ/  for ct <  . This ensures that
the SDE (4), with initial condition W0 = w has a unique strictly positive strong solution, see Karatzas and Shreve
(1998), pp. 287-289. This modiﬁcation has negligible impact for the quantitative questions we wish to analyze,
as discussed in the appendix.
3We know of only two papers that analyze such cases: Cochrane, Longstaﬀ, and Santa-Clara (2005) who
assume one representative investor with log utility and two stocks and Walden (2006), who assumes an OLG
structure with short-lived identical CARA investors. Neither approach is applicable to the problem we wish to
analyze. Our approach leads to an asymptotically stationary distribution of total wealth, as opposed to growing
expected total wealth in standard set-ups. In a diﬀerent (slightly more complicated) set-up, we obtain identical
results with nonstationary, growing expected total wealth.
5We make three remarks: First, as the Sharpe ratio is not time-scale invariant, it can be
used to calibrate the model to the true stock market. For example, if the real stock market has
an annual Sharpe ratio of 0.2, then the interpretation of t in our numerical example is that it
measures years.
Second, for wealth levels below σ2/g, the interest rate is negative, reﬂecting the fact that
the representative investor’s risk aversion is so high, that the risk-free asset must oﬀer negative
rates of return for him invest all his money in the stock. As we are working with real variables,
this could occur if there is inﬂation.
Third, the economy is observationally equivalent to a Lucas economy with a tree paying
a dividend stream following the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process dD = ρ(g − D)dt + ρσdB.T h e
representative investor with wealth Wt holds the claim to the whole technology output, which
provides him with dividend ﬂow to consume. At any time t, this claim costs exactly Pt, since it
allows the investor to keep the production assets, consume Ddt,a n db el e f tw i t hPt+dt.
2.2 Multiple stocks and two investors
We generalize the model to multiple stocks and investors. We assume a ﬁltered probability space
(Ω,F,Ft,P), and N-dimensional Ft-adapted standard Brownian motions Bt =( B1,t,...,B N,t) ,
(where   denotes transpose) satisfying the usual conditions, and Cov(dBi,t,dB j,t)=ρij dt.
There are N ﬁrms, i =1 ,...,N, with stock selling at price Pi. Without loss of generality
we assume that each stock is in unit supply. Similar to the one-stock case, the instantaneous
return of each stock is
˜ μi = μF
i dt + σF











and where gi and σi are ﬁrm-speciﬁc drift and volatility terms respectively. We deﬁne the vectors
g
def =( g1,...,g N)  and μF =( μF
1 ,...,μ F
N) ,a n dt h em a t r i xΣ=[ σi,j], with σi,j = σiσjρij.T h e
pair (g,Σ) thereby completely characterizes the real part of the economy. We assume that Σ is
invertible. The price at time t is represented by the price vector Pt =( P1,...,P N) .
There are two investors with time-separable log expected utility of consumption (2) and the
same intertemporal discount rate, ρ. These investors are enumerated by k ∈{ 1,2}.I n v e s t o r1
is rational and knows the correct (g,Σ). His belief is therefore g1 = g.
Investor 2 is irrational. He agrees with investor 1 about the correct Σ (which can be mo-
tivated by it being easy to infer volatilities and covariances in an arbitrary short time period
6in continuous time). However, he mistakes the drift term for g2 = g + δ,w h e r eδ ∈ RN is a
constant. Moreover, the irrational investor does not update his beliefs over time (that is why he
is irrational). The term δ is the irrational investor’s sentiment vector. It represents the multi-
stock version of the irrationality assumption made by Yan (2006). We do not formally model the
source of the irrational investor’s sentiment, but refer to the vast literature on potential sources
for such irrationality, see e.g., De Bond and Thaler (1985) and De Bond (1993). We use the
notation gk
i =[ gk]i. At each point in time, the two investors, of course, agree on the price, but
they disagree about the return prospects of investing in stock i, each investor believing it is:
˜ μk
i = μFk








,k ∈{ 1,2}, (6)
(the k superscript over the Brownian processes is added, as they will not agree about the
realization of the random term as time progresses). We denote the diﬀerent expectations for
the two investors by Ek, k ∈{ 1,2}. Finally, there is a risk-free bond in zero net supply oﬀering
instantaneous return r. We deﬁne the vector of drifts μFk =( μFk
1 ,...,μ Fk
N ) , and the volatility
matrix S = diag(σF
1 ,...,σF
N) .4 Finally, let the vectors α1,t,α 2,t ∈ RN denote the fraction of
wealth invested in diﬀerent stocks by investors 1 and 2 respectively.
The investors’ wealth processes, Wk,t follow the true stochastic processes:
dWk,t = −ck,tdt + Wk,t(rdt+ αk,t
 (μFdt + SdBt − r1Ndt)), (7)
whereas their perceived wealth processes are
dWk,t = −ck,tdt + Wk,t(rdt + αk,t
 (μF,kdt + SdBk,t − r1Ndt)), (8)
i.e., the irrational investor perceives the wrong drift-term and the wrong realization of the
Brownian motion. Here, 1N is the unity vector with N elements, 1N =( 1 ,...,1) .
An equilibrium is described by the following conditions: At each point in time,








, subject to (8).
4Here, diag(x1,...,x N) denotes a diagonal N × N matrix with xi as its ith diagonal element.
72. The net demand for the risk-free asset is zero: W1,t + W2,t = 1 
NPt.
3. The stock market clears: α1,tW1,t + α2,tW2,t = Pt.
We deﬁne the total wealth process Wt = W1,t+W2,t. The following proposition characterizes
the equilibrium completely:
Proposition 2 The unique equilibrium wealth process for two investors (with initial wealth W1,0































































and the consumption is ck,t = ρWk,t, k ∈{ 1,2}. The constants A, B, C and D depend on the
real economy characteristics (g,Σ) and the sentiment (δ):
A = 1 
Ng,
B = 1 
Nδ,
C = δ Σ−1δ,
D = 1 
NΣ1N.
The stochastic processes, Z1 and Z2 are deﬁned by Z1,t = P 
tSBt and Z2,t = δ Σ−1diag(Pt)SBt,
thereby satisfying: Va r(dZ1)=Ddt, Va r(dZ2)=Cd t , Cov(dZ1,d Z 2)=Bd t .
The constants A,B,C,D characterize how well rational investors take advantage of irrational
investors. Clearly, A is the aggregate drift term of the real economy, corresponding to g in the
one-ﬁrm case, and D is its total variance, corresponding to σ2. It is natural to call B the market
sentiment, as it is the sum of all stock sentiments. As we shall see below, it is natural to call C
8the arbitrageability of the market.
The way the terms enter into the deterministic part of the wealth equations (9-10) provides
some immediate information. First, bullish market sentiment (B>0) will lead to an expected
wealth transfer from rational to irrational investors. This is the eﬀect noted in DeLong, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waldman (1990) that bullish investors will over-invest in the stock market thereby
having higher expected returns than rational investors. Similarly, if they are bearish, they will
under-perform. Second, the arbitrageability coeﬃcient, C, will lead to an expected wealth
transfer from irrational to rational investors. This is true regardless of the sign of the sentiment,
as Σ−1 is strictly positive deﬁnite, so C is always strictly greater than zero, as long as there is
any sentiment in the market.
By setting W2,0 =0 ,w eg e tt h eN-stock version of the representative agent model of the
previous section with the following dynamics:

















consumption is ct = ρWt, and the stochastic process, Z is deﬁned by Zt = P 
tSBt with
VA R (dZ)=Ddt. The steady state wealth is ¯ W = A/ρ, the instantaneous market Sharpe
ratio is St =
√
D/Wt and the steady state market Sharpe ratio is ¯ S = ρ
√
D/A. In our analysis,
we will mainly study the steady state market Sharpe ratio, which we will simply call the market
Sharpe ratio.
Several insights arise from comparing the static structures of the equilibria, with and without
rational investors, for a speciﬁc wealth realization W = W1 + W2. We can, for example, use
equations (12,13) to analyze the price impact of the irrational investors. Let PR
i and PI
i represent
the price of stock i, for two identical economies, with the only diﬀerence that only rational
investors are present in the R-economy (W2 = 0), whereas irrational investors are present in the


















Thus, the price impact of irrational investors has two components. First, a market component,
9γ, that depends on the market sentiment (B)a n dw e a l t h( W2) of the irrational investors. This
component reﬂects the general equilibrium structure of the model: sentiment in one stock will
inﬂuence the prices of all other stocks. If the market sentiment is zero (B = 0), then the market
price error will also be zero. The second component (W2δi/(rRWPR
i )) is stock speciﬁc: it only
depends on the sentiment in stock i, δi.
We also note that when W2 is small, both these components are small. Thus, contrary to the
results in the model of Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerﬁeld (2006), when irrational investors
make up a small part of the market, their price impact (as well as their impact on interest
rates) is small in our model. The reason for this diﬀerence lies in the assumptions about the real
economy. Whereas aggregate production at a speciﬁc point in time is exogenous in Kogan, Ross,
Wang, and Westerﬁeld (2006), it is endogenous in our model. This gives increased opportunities
for consumption smoothing, and consumption “squeezes” can be avoided in bad states of the
world, resulting in less extreme behavior of the irrational investor in such states.
3 High-speed natural selection
We use the results in the previous section to analyze how the speed of natural selection process
depends on the number of stocks. Clearly, the constants A−D are crucial in deciding the wealth
developments. We saw that B and C determine expected wealth changes. It turns out that the
probability distribution for diﬀerent relative wealth levels only depends on the arbitrageability-







We also deﬁne the random stopping time
τf
def =i n f
t
{t : ft ≥ f}.
This is the time it takes until the rational investor controls a fraction f of the market wealth.
The following result characterizes the expected time it takes to reach a certain fraction of market
wealth:




















We see that C is indeed the crucial parameter for describing how fast natural selection occurs.
3.1 A one-factor economy
To see how C depends on N, let us study a simple model with one systematic risk and one
idiosyncratic risk driving returns in each stock. We call this the market model. We wish to keep
the total market uncertainty constant as N grows. To have the same risk at the market level,
we set
g = 1N/N, Σ=[ σij], with σ2
ii =8 /(N(N +1 ) ) , and σij =4 /(N(N +1 ) ) ,i  = j. (16)
This implies that A =1a n dD =4 ,s ow i t hρ = 10%, the steady state market Sharpe ratio is
the same as in the one-stock case S = ρ
√
D/A =0 .2, independently of N. We further assume
that the irrational investors are slightly bullish about the value creation process for exactly half
of the stocks and slightly bearish about the other half (assuming that N is even), i.e., for a
q>0, δi = q/N for i =1 ,...,N/2a n dδi = −q/N for i = N/2+1,...,N. We use Proposition 2
to get




Thus, by (14-15), as the number of stocks grows, the time it takes to reach any ﬁxed wealth
fraction for the rational investor is inversely proportional to the number of stocks, N +1 . F o r
the case where N =1 ,w eg e t 5 C = q2/4. Therefore, as with two stocks C =3 q2/4, the speed-up
of going from one to two stocks is even more drastic — it is 3 times faster with two stocks than
with one. If it takes, in expectation, 1800 years for the rational investor to capture 90% of the
market with one stock, it takes 600 years (i.e., 1800/3 years) with 2 stocks, and about 3 years
5In the case with only one stock, the market sentiment is not zero, as the irrational investor has to be either
bullish or bearish about this one stock.
11with 600 stocks (i.e., 1800/601 years). In Figure 1 we show the expected time to reach diﬀerent
wealth fractions for diﬀerent number of stocks, N =1 ,2,50,600, for the case where the rational
and irrational investor have the same initial wealth, f0 =1 /2. The numbers for f = 90% are in
line with the argument just made.
The distribution of τf is thin-tailed. In fact, as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, it is
the ﬁrst passage time distribution of a Brownian motion with drift C/2a n dv a r i a n c eC per unit
time. This distribution is known, and decreases faster than a normal distribution for any ﬁxed
f. In Figure 2, we show the time distribution to reach f = 90%, with f0 =0 .5, for N =2 ,
N =1 0a n dN =5 0s t o c k s .






















Figure 1: Expected time, E[τf], for rational investors to reach a speciﬁc fraction of total wealth, f =
W1/(W1 + W2),f o rN =1 , N =2 , N =5 0and N = 600 stocks, when irrational investors’ sentiment is
q = 10%.
We also note that even though the natural selection process is faster, the irrational investors
are never totally wiped out, regardless of the number of stocks in the market and the time passed,
as they become excessively risk-averse once they become poor. We still use the terminology of
the group being “wiped out,” denoting that their fraction of wealth becomes small, e.g., 10% of
total wealth.
How does the rational investor take advantage of the irrational investor so fast? By studying
the rational investor’s portfolio choice (given in the appendix) it is clear that the rational investor
will choose exactly the type of long-short position suggested in the introduction. In the case of
equal wealth for the rational and irrational investor, for example, in addition to holding his part

























































Figure 2: Probability distribution of the time it takes for rational investors to reach 90% of total wealth
for N =2 , N =1 0and N =5 0stocks, when irrational investors’ sentiment is q = 10%.
of the market portfolio, corresponding to the case with only one rational investor, the rational
investor will speculate against the irrational investor, by longing (N +1)q/2s h a r e so fe a c hs t o c k
that the irrational investor is pessimistic about, and short-selling the same amount of each stock
the irrational investor is optimistic about. This gets rid of the market risk, so investor 1 is only
exposed to a low level of idiosyncratic risk, and therefore earns an excess gross payoﬀ of about
q per unit time. The strategy closely resembles ideas for how to form market neutral portfolios
with excess return in multi-factor economies, proposed e.g., in Rosenberg and Rudd (1982) and
Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985). As shown in the appendix, the rational investor’s Sharpe
ratio is essentially proportional to q
√
N, whereas the irrational investor on the other hand will
have a Sharpe ratio proportional to −q
√
N. The market Sharpe ratio is almost constant, so the
wealth transfer can not be inferred from market level data.
3.2 General economies
The main objectives of this section are to show that natural selection will be fast in markets
with large state spaces under general conditions and that if a large arbitrary random economy
is chosen, the natural selection process will almost always be fast.
13How representative is the market model of Section 3.1? It turns out that high-speed natural
selection occurs almost universally in our model, even though the natural selection process may
not be as fast as in the market model. For example, sentiments need not to be symmetric.
Consider the market model with the same real-economy parameters as before (implying that
A =1a n dD = 4), but with asymmetric sentiments: being q1 for a fraction, a,o ft h es t o c k s
and q2 for the rest, 1 − a.6 Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 <a<1, (as the cases
a =0a n da = 1 are covered by taking q1 = q2 = q). We call this the asymmetric market model.















Thus, by Proposition 3, high-speed natural selection will occur unless the term multiplying N
equals zero. It is easy to show that the term equals zero if and only if q1 = q2.7
To study a more general set-up, we introduce a sequence of markets M =( M1,...,MN,...)
where MN =( gN,ΣN,δ N), is a market with N stocks. We do not make any restrictions on M.
However, we will mainly be interested in sequence of markets where the market Sharpe ratio,
size and total sentiment are roughly constant when N increases. We deﬁne






Thus contrary to the market sentiment (B), the total sentiment aggregates unsigned sentiment
information. We could for example have zero market sentiment, although the total sentiment is
high. We use the notation aN ∼ bN, if there are strictly positive constants, 0 <c 0 ≤ c1 < ∞,
such that for N large enough, c0bN ≤ aN ≤ c1bN.
Deﬁnition 2 A sequence of markets, M =( M1,M2,...),i ss a i dt ob easymptotically well-
behaved if market Sharpe ratios ¯ SN ∼ 1, sizes of markets AN ∼ 1 and total sentiments ΔN ∼ 1.
For a sequence of markets, M,w es a yt h a t
6We restrict our study to the cases when aN and (1 − a)N are both integers, to avoid issues rounding issues.
7If q1 = q2,t h e nC = q
2/4 regardless of N and the whole model collapses into the one-stock case.
14Deﬁnition 3 High-speed natural selection occurs if, in market MN, the expected time to reach
the fraction of wealth f, when initial wealth distribution is f0,s a t i s ﬁ e sE(τf) ≤ G(f0,f,N) for
some function G :( 0 ,1) × (0,1) × Z++ → R++




Deﬁnition 4 High-speed natural selection of order ν (where ν>0)o c c u r si ft h ef u n c t i o nG in
Deﬁnition 3 can be written in the form G(f0,f,N)=H(f0,f)/N ν.
We let CN denote the arbitrageability term in market MN. Clearly, Proposition 3 implies that





Nν , where CN = δ 
NΣ−1
N δN,
is not zero, i.e., 0 <c≤∞ . We deﬁne ρ(Σ) to be the spectral radius of the matrix Σ. We have:
Proposition 4 For a sequence of markets, M, high-speed natural selection of order ν occurs if
there are strictly positive constants c1, c2 and N0, and a function, f : Z++ → R++ such that the
following two conditions are satisﬁed for all N>N 0:
• δ 
NδN ≥ c1f(N),
• ρ(Σ) ≤ c2N−νf(N).
Proposition 4 cannot be applied to prove high-speed natural selection of order one in the
market model of Section 3.1.9 However, the following proposition ensures that when real econ-
omy randomness is symmetric, in the sense that 1N is an eigenvector to Σ,10 then the only cases
where high-speed natural selection of order one will not occur is when there is no spread of
sentiment across stocks or when the covariance matrix is asymptotically not well-behaved. For
an arbitrary vector, q, we deﬁne Qq to be the Euclidean projection operator onto the orthogonal
complement of q.11 We have
8Here, and subsequently, Z++ represents the set of strictly positive integers and R++, the set of strictly positive
real numbers.
9This is easily seen: The ﬁrst condition implies that f(N) ∼ N
−1, which leads to a violation of the second
condition, as ρ(ΣN) ∼ N
−1.
10The symmetry here is that each row of the variance covariance matrix sums to the same constant, for any
speciﬁc N. This is of course equivalent to 1N being an eigenvector. Clearly, it holds for the market model, as
well as for several other models, e.g., with industry-speciﬁc risks.
11That is, with matrix notation, Qq = I −
qq 
q q,w h e r eI is the identity matrix.
15Proposition 5 For a sequence of markets, M, high-speed natural selection of order ν occurs if
there are strictly positive constants c1, c2, N0, and a function, f : Z++ → R++, such that the
following three conditions are satisﬁed for all N>N 0:








It is straightforward to check that both the market model and the asymmetric market model
satisfy the conditions of Proposition 5 with ν = 1, except for the asymmetric market model
with q1 = q2.12 This is in line with our analysis so far. The only other case when high-speed
natural selection may fail for the market model is when the third condition is violated (the ﬁrst
condition is obviously always satisﬁed for the market model). For general variance covariance
matrices of the form ΣN =( aIN + b1 
N1N)/(Na+ bN2), a>0, b ≥ 0, this happens if and only
if b = 0. In this case, there are eﬀectively N separate ﬁnancial markets, and there is no gain to
the rational investor of being able to form long-short portfolios.
Under the conditions of Proposition 5, as the number of stocks increases, natural selection
works faster. In the limit, as the number of stocks N grows, the arbitrageability approaches
inﬁnity and the natural selection becomes instantaneous. It is worth pointing out, however,
that for any ﬁnite N, there are never any pure arbitrage opportunities in the model, as investors
agree on zero-probability events. It is shown in the appendix that for an asymptotically well-
behaved sequence of markets, high-speed natural selection implies the presence of an asymptotic
arbitrage opportunity (Ross, 1976). However, this opportunity is not scalable in our general
equilibrium model, contrary to the assumptions of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory. This makes
our model suitable for the dynamic study of the natural selection process.
Propositions 4 and 5 can be used to prove high-speed natural selection for a speciﬁc sequence
of markets but do not say how “often” high-speed natural selection breaks down. Is high-speed
natural selection the norm, or are the previous examples just exceptional special cases? To
approach this question, we use theory of random quadratic forms. Speciﬁcally, we study how
often high-speed natural selection occurs in randomly generated markets. We look at a special
case of a random market (one factor) model. In the appendix we discuss how the results can be
generalized to K-factor models and to even more general random economies.
12If q1 = q2 in the asymmetric market model, the second condition of Proposition 5 fails.
16We make the following assumptions about the randomness of the markets, MN =( gN,ΣN,δ N).
We assume that (gN)i =˜ pN
i /N,w h e r e˜ pN
i are i.i.d. random variables, E(˜ p1
1)=¯ p>0a n d
Va r(p1
1)=σ2
p > 0. Similarly, (δN)i =˜ qN
i /N,w h e r e˜ qN
i are i.i.d. random variables, E(˜ q1
1)=¯ q
and Va r(˜ q1
1)=σ2
q > 0. Furthermore, we assume that the randomness of the ith asset, σidBit,
is of the form σidBit = 1
N(βN
i dξ0t + αN
i dξit), where ξit are i.i.d. jointly independent standard
Brownian motions, and αN
i , βN
i are i.i.d. random variables: E(α1




1)=¯ β and Va r(β1
1)=σ2
β > 0. All random variables are jointly independent. For simplic-
ity, we assume that all random variables are absolutely continuous (with respect to Lebesgue
measure) and that the β’s are (a.s.) bounded below by a strictly positive constant,  >0.13 Obvi-
ously, we require the ˜ p’s to be positive. For a ﬁxed N,t h em a r k e tMN will thus be characterized
by gN =( ˜ pN
1 ,...,˜ pN
N) /N, δN =( ˜ qN
1 ,...,˜ qN
N) /N and ΣN =( diag(αN
1 ,...,α N
N)2 + bNb 
N)/N 2,
where bN =( βN
1 ,...,βN
N) . This corresponds to sequences of generalized market models, with
random loadings on the market factor and idiosyncratic factors for each stock, with random
value creation and random sentiment. We have
Proposition 6 A sequence of markets, M, satisfying the previous assumptions is asymptotically
well-behaved (almost surely), and has high-speed natural selection of order one (almost surely).
Thus, high-speed natural selection is really the norm in such markets, and the exception is when
it breaks down.
3.3 Variations
In this section, we discuss several variations under which high-speed natural selection occurs
that provide additional insight. Speciﬁcally, we show that high-speed natural selection can arise
even if sentiment is uniform, if both investors are irrational and that the order of the natural
selection process can be higher than one.
Uniform sentiments: P r o p o s i t i o n s2–5c a nb eu s e df o ra d d i t i o n a la n a l y s i so fs p e c i ﬁ c
markets. Let us, for example, analyze a market with ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes and show that, in
this case, even uniform sentiment can lead to high speed natural selection.
Suppose that there are N ﬁrms, i =1 ,...,N,e a c hw i t hsi stocks outstanding. In the previous
analysis, we had unit supply of each stock. However, it is easy to incorporate variable supply. Let
us deﬁne the vector s =( s1,...sN) , and the diagonal matrix Λs = diag(s). Consider the market
13These assumptions can be relaxed in several directions, but at the expense of increased complexity.
17M =( ˆ g, ˆ Σ, ˆ δ)
def =( Λ sg,ΛsΣΛs,Λsδ). This can be thought of as a market with each stock in unit
supply and ﬁrm characteristics and sentiments deﬁned by ˆ g, ˆ Σa n dˆ δ respectively. Alternatively,
it can be interpreted as a market with stock supply given by s and ﬁrm characteristics and
sentiments per unit supply of stock given by g,Σa n dδ respectively.
Now consider a sequence of markets with
sN =( s1,...sN) , gN = g1N, ΣN = σ2IN,δ N = q1N, (17)
















Without loss of generality, we can assume that the si’s are decreasing, s1 ≥ s2 ≥···. According
to our previous discussion, the market with N stocks is characterized by ˆ gN = gsN, ˆ Σ=σ2Λ2
s
and ˆ δ = qsN. Irrational investors are equally bullish about all stocks, so the (relative) market
sentiment is equal to (relative) individual stock sentiment. This is one of the two cases when
high-speed natural selection collapsed in the market model in Section 3.1.





























In order to make comparisons between diﬀerent assets and their returns we introduce the
following notation. Recall that μF
it denotes the instantaneous expected return of asset i.F o r
each asset, i, let us deﬁne γi,t
def = rt/μF
i,t, i.e., γi,t measures the cost of rt units of expected surplus
by investing in asset i:




The risky assets with γi,t < 1 have positive expected excess return. The assets with γi,t > 1
have negative expected excess return.











The above expression for prices implies that (actual) expected excess return for each company




This in turn means that when sentiment is optimistic (positive) and identical across all stocks,
the actual risk premium for small stocks is low and even becomes negative when the above
inequality fails to hold. For rational investors, such stocks are overpriced (negative excess
return and positive market β), so rational investors will short-sell such small stocks. As the
irrational investors are driven out of the market, stock prices adjust to their fundamental level.
This stylized argument ﬁts qualitatively well with what was observed during the New Economy
boom. Young growth companies had high stock prices, measured with standard indicators, and
their prices eventually collapsed, whereas mature value companies were hit less severely by the
market downturn.
Next, let us study the speed of the natural selection process in this kind of market. To make
our point, we study sequences of markets that have similar market Sharpe ratios, regardless
of the choice of the si’s. To achieve this, we scale with T1 and T2, i.e., we study sequences of
markets with











Regardless of the choice of si’s, the market Sharpe ratio, ¯ S = ρ
√
DN/AN,c o n v e r g e st oρσ/g,
as N becomes large, so this is the correct scaling when comparing sequences of markets with
diﬀerent s’s.
Proposition 4 immediately implies that high-speed natural selection of order one will always
























Thus, as long as T1 < ∞, high-speed natural selection of order one will occur, even though irra-
tional investors’ sentiments are uniform across stocks. For example, if the sizes of the companies
19decrease geometrically: sk = sk,w h e r es is a constant between zero and one (0 <s<1), then




so the faster the decrease in ﬁrm size (s closer to zero), the faster the natural selection. When s
approaches one, high speed natural selection disappears, in line with our previous result: When
sizes of ﬁrms are equal and sentiment is uniform across stocks, rational investors can do nothing
better then hold the market portfolio.
Both investors are irrational: If both investor groups are irrational, then high speed
natural selection will still occur, favoring the investor group that is least irrational in a metric
weighted by the inverse of the covariance matrix. Under the same assumptions as before, but
with the ﬁrst and second investors, having sentiment vectors δ1 ∈ RN and δ2 ∈ RN respectively,
we get the following generalization of Proposition 3.
Proposition 7 If the initial fraction of wealth owned by investor group 1 is f0, C1
def = δ 
1Σ−1δ1,
C2
def = δ 
2Σ−1δ2, C12
def = δ 







4η(C2 + C1 − 2C12)
(C2 − C1)3 , (22)











Higher-order natural selection: Our examples so far have led to high-speed natural
selection of order one. Natural selection of other orders may also occur. The deﬁnition of
C = δ Σ−1δ, shows that the closer Σ is to singular, the faster we can expect the natural
selection process to take place. For example, for a constant ν>−1, the sequence of markets






N2 , (ΣN)ij =
1
N2,i  = j, and (δN)i =( −1)iq, (23)
will lead to high-speed natural selection of order 1+ν. This can be shown by a direct application
of Proposition 5. Thus, an eﬃcient way for sophisticated investors to take advantage of unso-
phisticated ones is to introduce highly correlated assets. For example, we could interpret the
20economy, as one where some ﬁrms have “dot.com” names and irrational investors have positive
sentiment about these, although they are eﬀectively identical to other ﬁrms. If such assets are
introduced, then even a slight degree of sentiment can lead to fast natural selection.
High-speed natural selection can thus be achieved in various ways. To summarize: According
to our model, sophisticated investors can eﬃciently take advantage of unsophisticated ones in
markets with large spread of ﬁrm sizes, in markets with many ﬁnancial (i.e., zero-net supply)
assets, in markets with ﬁrms that have highly correlated value creation and in markets where
there is a large sentiment dispersion across assets.
3.4 Discussion
An alternative interpretation of our results is that investors with systematic sentiments die out
slowly, whereas any idiosyncratic sentiment will be punished very quickly. For example, in the
market model of Section 3.1, only uniform sentiment (δ ∝ 1) survives in the intermediate term.
Such sentiment is parallel to market risk.14 This interpretation is in line with the results in
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), where the authors, using a one period model,
ﬁnd that arbitrageurs will remove idiosyncratic mispricing but not systematic mispricing. In our
model, it is possible for irrational investors to survive a long time in the market, but only if they
have a very restricted type of irrationality: In a market with 500 stocks and ﬁve factors there
are 495 types of irrationality that will be punished very quickly and ﬁve that will be punished
slowly.
In our examples so far, rational investors have been short-selling overpriced stocks. Do the
results survive in markets with short-sale constraints? In the market model of Section 3.1,
high-speed natural selection will not occur if short-sale constraints are present. However, short-
sale constraints do not seem to be binding in the market (see, e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner
2006), so we do not view this as a major concern. In the appendix we discuss why high-speed
natural selection breaks down with short-sale constraints for market model. We also show
other examples for which high-speed natural selection occurs even with short-selling constraints
present. For example, in rapidly expanding markets, high-speed natural selection can occur even
with short-sale constraints, as the payoﬀ of investing in the winners may be very high.
14The principal component of Σ is (proportional to) 1, representing market risk in the economy.
214 Arbitrageability in the U.S. stock market
How applicable is our model to the U.S. stock market? Clearly, we do not see the extreme cases
where unsophisticated traders are almost immediately wiped out of the market, so the market
model of Section 3.1 does not seem to calibrate well with the real world.
However, studies of individual investor performance do ﬁnd quite severe underperformanceby
unsophisticated investors, so one-stock models, in which it takes hundreds of years for irrational
investors to be wiped out, seem equally ill-calibrated. For example, individual investors in the
study by Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2005) underperform institutional investors by about
2.1% per year, which implies a 50% underperformance in a 30-year horizon. Thus, neither the
market model of Section 3.1, nor the one-stock model seem to quantitatively be in line with
arbitrageability in the real stock market.
Propositions 4–6 are of little help here, as they provide asymptotic results and do not tell us
about constants involved. However, qualitatively, the requirements of Proposition 5 for speed-up
of the natural selection process in the stock market, i.e., spread in stock sentiment and correlated
stock returns, seem to be met in real markets. For example, returns in boom periods have been
driven by speciﬁc sectors, like the Internet and high-tech sectors in the New Economy boom
(Ofek and Richardson, 2002; Lamont and Thaler, 2003). This suggests that if sentiment was a
driver in the boom, it was not uniform across stocks. Moreover, numerous studies estimate the
number of risks present in the stock market to be higher than one, but much lower than the
dimensionality of the stock market, e.g. Connor and Korajczyk (1993).
We can, in principle, estimate the arbitrageability of a market, C, using observable data.
This immediately implies the speed of the natural selection process through Proposition 3. We
do this in two ways: ﬁrst using stock returns, and then using trading volume. The results are
quite similar: The ﬁrst method suggests that it takes about 45 years to wipe out irrational
investors, whereas the second measure suggests that it takes about 58 years. This corresponds
to an average annual underperformance of 3.9%–5.0% per year, which is slightly larger than,
but of the same order of magnitude as, the results in Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2005).
These results are indicative but should not be oversold. The empirical estimates we use
are rough and do not control for other factors driving returns and trading volume. A detailed
empirical analysis, although clearly of interest, is not within the scope of this paper.
224.1 Method
A return-based estimate: Using the expected return vector μF, the return covariance matrix,
ΣF =[ ¯ σij]ij, the expected excess return vector, μe = μF − rt1N, and the relative ﬁrm size
s = P/1 








C =( Σ Fs − μe) (ΣF)−1(ΣFs − μe). (24)
Although this does not totally nail down C, it captures the main source of wealth transfer to
the rational investor in equations (9-10). We make the simplifying assumption that f0 = 50%.15
At any point in time, s is observable, whereas ΣF and μe must be estimated. To estimate the
covariance matrix, ΣF, we used both the sample covariance matrix, and the weighted covariance
estimator suggested by Litterman and Winkelmann (1998).
A weakness of this measure is the diﬃculty of empirically estimating stock-wise expected
excess returns, μe. To get around this issue, we note that (24) can be rewritten as:
X = σ2
m − 2μm + Y, where Y = μ 
e(ΣF)−1μe.
Here, σm is the volatility of the market portfolio and μm is the market risk-premium. A lower
bound for Y is given by Y ≥ Nμ2
m/R, where N is the number of stocks and R = ρ(ΣF)i st h e
spectral radius of the covariance matrix. Thus, market level data for volatility and risk-premium,
together with an estimate of the spectral radius of the covariance matrix, lead to a lower bound
for arbitrageability
C ≥ 4 ˆ X, where ˆ X = σ2





This is our return-based arbitrageability estimate.
A volume-based estimate: As noted, the return-based estimate, ˆ X, suﬀers from the
diﬃculties in measuring expected returns. Another approach that does not suﬀer from this
drawback is to use data for trading volumes.
Trading in our model arises when there is wealth transfer between rational and irrational
investors: the higher the degree of wealth transfer, the higher the volume. We deﬁne the






t (α1,tW1,t − α2,tW2,t), (26)
15Analogue results for other values, ˆ f0, are immediately obtained by the mapping C  → (2 − 2 ˆ f0)
−2C.
23where Λt = diag(Pt). Then, dzt is the signed instantaneous relative trading volume, measured
as a fraction of market capitalization. We let qt denote the observed (unsigned) relative trading
volume in the real stock market. We assume that investors’ rebalancing interval is Δt,w h i c h
leads to the relation qt = |
 t
t−Δt dzt|/Δt.16 We assume that Δt =1 /12, i.e., that investors
rebalance once per month. We deﬁne ¯ qt = E[qt], the expected relative turnover, which we
will approximate with the sample mean. Finally, we assume that the market sentiment is small
compared with the total sentiment, i.e., that B< <Δa n dt h a tf0 =0 .5.










































i ¯ σiiΔt + o(Δt), 17 (28)
where, as before, S = diag(¯ σ11,...,¯ σNN). Altogether, this leads us to











This is our volume-based arbitrageability estimate.18
4.2 Data
Both our estimates use the return covariance matrix. Ideally, we would wish to estimate the
arbitrageability of the whole market, but this is not feasible due to the diﬃculties of accurately
estimating N(N +1 ) /2 variances and covariances for N stocks. We therefore use a randomly
selected subset of S&P 500 stocks.
We used the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to get daily data for returns
and turnover of 40 randomly chosen S&P 500 stocks, over the ten-year period 1996-2005. We
16This avoids the issue of inﬁnite trading volumes due to the unbounded variation of Brownian motions.
17Here y(x)=o(x) denotes that limx 0 y(x)/x =0 .
18Our estimate is based on the assumption that trading volume mostly is driven by speculation. A generalization
of the volume-based measure would be to divide trading volume into into a speculative and a nonspeculative
component. The implied arbitrageability would be lower with such a decomposition.
24used the one-month T-bill rate adjusted to a daily basis as the risk-free rate. The identity of,
and summary statistics for, the individual companies are shown in Table 1. The end-of-period
total market capitalization of companies in the sample was USD 893 Billion, corresponding to
an average company size of USD 22 Billion. The median company size was USD 11 Billion. The
largest company was Pfeizer Inc. (PFE) with a market capitalization of USD 172 Billion. The
smallest company was Steak N Shake (SNS) with a market capitalization of USD 0.47 Billion.
The annualized value-weighted average excess return for the companies in the sample was 6.1%
per year and the annualized portfolio volatility was 16.5%. The average annualized turnover
was about 95%.
4.3 Results
We estimate the arbitrageability from the return-based statistic, ˆ X, for 3-40 stocks. The results
are shown in Figure 3. We see that for above 15 stocks, the estimated arbitrageability is almost





















Figure 3: Estimated arbitrageability from return-based measure, ˆ X, as a function of number of stocks,
N. Above: Estimated arbitrageability coeﬃcient, C. Below: Expected time (in years) for rational
investors to capture 90% of wealth.
constant. With all 40 stocks, we have ˆ X =0 .025, which corresponds to an arbitrageability of
C =0 .10. This implies that it takes, in expectation, 44 years for rational investors to capture
90% of the market if both groups start with the same wealth. Equivalently, it corresponds to an
average underperformance of 5.0% per year for irrational investors. This suggests a faster process
25compared with the 2.1% underperformance shown in Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2005), but
clearly it is more in line with these results than the hundreds of years elsewhere suggested.
The results are quite similar when using the volume-based measure, shown in Figure 4.
Again, when more than 15 stocks are included in the sample, the estimated arbitrageability is
almost constant. With all 40 stocks, ˆ Z =0 .012, corresponding to C =0 .076. This implies that
it takes, in expectation, 58 years for rational investors to capture 90% of the market if both
groups start with the same wealth, corresponding to an underperformance of 3.9% per year for
irrational investors.






















Figure 4: Estimated arbitrageability from volume-based measure, ˆ Z, as a function of number of stocks,
N. Above: Estimated arbitrageability coeﬃcient, C. Below: Expected time (in years) for rational
investors to capture 90% of wealth.
5 Concluding remarks
Theory alone does not tell us how fast irrational investors will be wiped out from the stock
market. As we have shown, the time it takes may vary by several orders of magnitude, ranging
from a few months to hundreds — or even thousands — of years. The speed depends on the
so-called arbitrageability of the market. The arbitrageability is a function of both real stock
market characteristics and the stock-wise sentiment of irrational investors. High-speed natural
selection occurs in stock markets with large state spaces, which allow rational investors to take
26advantage of irrational investors more eﬀectively than in markets with only one stock and one
bond. We show that for very large markets, high-speed natural selection is the norm rather than
the exception.
Our analysis is connected to pure noarbitrage theory and to the arbitrage pricing theory.
The original theory provides bounds on the degree of irrationality allowed for a trader not to
be immediately wiped out. We show that, if the market is right, even a much lower degree of
irrationality (compared with the pure arbitrage case) may lead to a fast punishment. In our
model there are no real arbitrage opportunities — neither for pure arbitrage nor for scalable
asymptotic arbitrage. The arbitrage is statistical and the general equilibrium features of the
model allow it to be dynamically quantiﬁed.
The results have implications for investor performance in stock markets. A rough empirical
calibration of the model to the US stock market suggests that it takes about ﬁfty years to wipe
out an irrational investor. The result is equivalent to an average underperformance of 3.9-5.0%
per year for unsophisticated investors, compared with sophisticated ones. This is in line with
recent studies of individual investor performance.
27No. Ticker Company Name Excess return Volatility Turnover Market cap.
1 FO FORTUNE BRANDS INC 0.103 0.26 0.81 11.3
2 KO COCA COLA CO -0.012 0.26 0.47 95.9
3 DD DU PONT E I DE NEMOURS CO 0.012 0.30 0.76 39.0
4 GM GENERAL MOTORS CORP -0.070 0.34 1.84 10.9
5 ITT I T T INDUSTRIES INC 0.132 0.28 1.12 9.49
6 COP CONOCOPHILLIPS
19 0.121 0.26 0.92 82.8
7 CR CRANE CO 0.063 0.30 0.83 2.12
8 LMT LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 0.028 0.30 1.13 27.7
9 PFE PFIZER INC 0.060 0.31 0.68 171.9
10 MMM 3M CO 0.078 0.26 0.96 58.8
11 HNZ HEINZ H J CO 0.0099 0.23 0.74 11.2
12 SNS STEAK N SHAKE CO 0.042 0.37 0.58 0.47
13 K KELLOGG CO 0.0034 0.27 0.54 17.9
14 COHU COHU INC 0.033 0.58 1.98 0.50
15 PLL PALL CORP -0.012 0.31 0.93 3.34
16 MDP MEREDITH CORP 0.067 0.27 0.94 2.07
17 MCD MCDONALDS CORP 0.015 0.29 0.95 42.4
18 MMC MARSH & MCLENNAN COS INC 0.068 0.32 0.89 17.2
19 BNI BURLINGTON NORTHERN CP 0.084 0.28 0.88 26.4
20 GWW GRAINGER W W INC 0.057 0.30 1.01 6.35
21 CTX CENTEX CORP 0.210 0.40 2.75 9.13
22 ITW ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC 0.089 0.28 0.70 24.6
23 STA ST PAUL TRAVELERS COS INC 0.040 0.30 1.18 30.9
24 CTL CENTURYTEL INC 0.058 0.30 1.19 4.3
25 FDX FEDEX CORP 0.147 0.33 1.25 31.4
26 DLX DELUXE CORP 0.038 0.25 1.15 1.52
27 CSX C S X CORP -0.0035 0.32 0.99 11.0
28 TMK TORCHMARK CORP 0.085 0.26 0.76 5.77
29 STI SUNTRUST BANKS INC 0.065 0.26 0.64 26.2
30 MYL MYLAN LABS INC 0.036 0.42 1.73 4.29
31 BBK B B & T CORP 0.117 0.25 0.45 22.7
32 GFR GREAT AMERICAN FINANCIAL RES 0.020 0.23 0.06 0.93
33 BJS B J SERVICES CO 0.217 0.49 3.61 11.8
34 AZO AUTOZONE INC 0.083 0.35 1.99 7.03
35 EP EL PASO CORP -0.026 0.51 1.77 8.01
36 KSS KOHLS CORP 0.179 0.37 1.60 16.7
37 PX PRAXAIR INC 0.096 0.31 1.15 17.0
38 ABC AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORP 0.134 0.41 2.55 8.63
39 WOR WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES INC -0.0041 0.37 1.12 1.69
40 ROK ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC 0.119 0.33 0.90 10.5
All 0.0607 0.165 0.938 893.24
Table 1: Summary statistics for companies in sample. Time period: 1996-2005. Excess return denotes
annualized excess return over 30-day T-bill rate, using geometric means. Variance is deﬁned as annualized
sample variance of daily returns. Turnover denotes annual number of shares traded, divided by shares
outstanding. Market capitalization is measured on end-date (12/30 2005). Source: CRSP.
19Until 2002, Phillips Petroleum (P). In 2002, Conoco and Phillips merged to form ConocoPhillips (COP).
28Appendix
The production economy
We present the model in discrete time, and then take the continuous time limit. One ﬁrm produces a
consumption good. The ﬁrm exists as a sequence of one-period entities and we include the time scale Δt.T h e
ﬁrm uses a concave production technology as follows: for small production levels, the marginal cost of producing
an additional unit increases, but above a speciﬁc level, it is constant. The ﬁrm uses marginal cost pricing, e.g.
motivated by competition.
20 The production process is reversible, so there is no waste related to overproducing.
There is also a ﬁxed cost to producing in each time period, k = qΔt + ξnΔtσ
√
Δt, where the ﬁrst part is
deterministic and the second part is stochastic and ξnΔt ∼ Normal(0,1) are i.i.d. shocks over time.
The expected total surplus of producing and selling goods in one period is therefore bounded by g Δt for g
deﬁned as follows:
g = z − q, where z =
Z C(t)
0
(p − mc(s))ds (30)
is the total variable part of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt per unit time. That is, if the demand for consumption at time t is
C(t), the variable cost of producing an additional good is mc(s), and the price for the good is p, then the total
surplus generated is z − k (revenue – variable cost – ﬁxed cost), and z − q is the deterministic part. The idea is
that mc(s)=p(s) above a small threshold, so even if C(t) varies, the stochastic process for the total proﬁt will
be the same. As we shall see, under market clearing, this endogenously leads to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
for consumption per unit time, which ﬁts well with the notion of a business cycle.
We assume that the probability that demand will be below the point of constant marginal cost is negligible,
so this is exactly the surplus created per unit time.
21 For timing purposes, we assume that the good is produced
and sold immediately (at t), whereas the cash ﬂow of holding the stock is realized at time t+Δ t, i.e., is paid out
as an end-of-period liquidating dividend.
In each period, the ﬁrm is set up and one divisible share, representing full ownership in the ﬁrm, is sold at the
market clearing price. Then the product is produced, sold and proﬁts are realized. Finally, the ﬁrm is liquidated
and the value is paid out. The short term cash-ﬂows of investing in the ﬁrm at time t if the market clearing price














Time: t t +Δ t
Cash ﬂows: −P P + gΔt + σ(−ξ)
√
Δt
Table 2: Cash ﬂows from investing in ﬁrm.
Proof of Proposition 1: Special case of Proposition 2.
20The assumption of ﬂat marginal costs to producing above a certain level can be viewed as an approximation
of a market in which marginal costs are steep for small production quantities, and almost ﬂat for large production
quantities. The key assumption that allows us to simplify the analysis is that the gross proﬁt of the ﬁrm is
insensitive to demand shocks.
21This is assumed for simplicity, and imposes no major restriction. The model can also be formulated without
the assumption, with ξt’s having compact distributional support. In this case, the equilibrium conditions derived
in what follows will be the same as, long as consumption demand is above the threshold (which by assumption can
be arbitrarily small). This formulation complicates the notation considerably without oﬀering additional insight
about the objects for our attention, the wealth processes, so we avoid it.
29Proof of Proposition 2:
As shown in Merton (1969), solving the optimal consumption problem for inﬁnitely lived log-investors is
speciﬁcally simple: Regardless of the future investment opportunity set, the investors behave myopically: in-
stantaneously consuming ρWk,tdt, and only caring about instantaneous returns when making portfolio decisions.
Also, investors will instantaneously choose mean-variance eﬃcient portfolios. Deﬁne Λt = diag(Pt).
The perceived instantaneous return of the stocks at time t for investor k is ˜ μ
k = μ
Fkdt + SdB
k,a n dt h e





k − rtPt). (32)
The stock market clearing condition then becomes:









2 − rtPt)=Σ 1N ⇒







This is the stated equation for the price process.
Premultiplying the price equation with 1
 
N and using 1
 
NPt = Wt leads to the equation for the interest rate
(11). Finally, plugging in the portfolio choices (32) into the true equation for the wealth process equation (7),
leads to the wealth processes:
dWk,t
Wk,t






1 − rtPt)dt +Λ SdBt
”
. (34)
From the pricing equation, (33), it follows that
g















Plugging these into (34), together with interest rate formula (11) leads to the derived wealth dynamics (9-10).
22
Proof of Proposition 3:
We deﬁne zt
def = W1t/W2t. Clearly, zt = ft/(1 − ft). Itˆ o calculus implies that











22This derivation shows that the equilibrium exists and is unique except for one special case. When rt =0 ,
it breaks down. In this case, there is either no equilibrium, or multiple price vectors that all provide equilibria.
Similar to the argument about very low levels of production in Section 2.1, a modiﬁcation of the value generation
process to keep interest rates positive can be made to avoid issues about existence of equilibria. Such low aggregate
wealth levels are extremely rare events, occurring on average less than once in 10,000 years in our calibrations,
so they have few implications for the speed of natural selection.
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where ˜ B is a standard Brownian motion. This is, of course, in line with the literature of growth-rate optimal port-
folios, which ensures that a rational investor with log-utility will dominate the market in the long run (Hakansson,
1971). The initial condition is log(z0)=l o g ( f0/(1−f0)) and the ﬁrst passage distribution of the time it takes for
log(zt)t or e a c hl o g ( f/(1 − f)), is therefore (Ingersoll, 1987)
τf =
log(f/(1 − f)) − log(f0/(1 − f0))
(2πCt3)1/2 e
−(log(f/(1−f))−log(f0/(1−f0))−Ct/2)2/(2Ct).





log(f/(1 − f)) − log(f0/(1 − f0))
”
and the variance is
Va r(τf)=





log(f/(1 − f)) − log(f0/(1 − f0))
”
.

















The ﬁrst part of these positions correspond to the market hedging part, which is the only component if there are
no sentiments. The second part is the speculative part, where investor 1 and 2 take opposite positions. Under




where the sign-operation is taken element-wise on the δ vector. This thus corresponds to a long-short portfolio,
scaled up linearly in N.















−1(−W2,tδ +Σ 1N)/Wt p
(P − W2,tΛΣ−1δ) Λ−1ΣΛ−1(P − W2,tΛΣ−1δ)
=
q









−1(−W2,tδ +Σ 1N)/Wt p
(P + W1,tΛΣ−1δ) Λ−1ΣΛ−1(P + W1,tΛΣ−1δ)
=
D +( W1,t − W2,t)B − W1,tW2,tC
Wt
q
D +2 W1,tB + W 2
1,tC
.
In the case of study, when B =0 ,C = q














so for large N, the Sharpe ratio of investor 1 is basically proportional to q
√
N, whereas it is proportional to
−q
√










which under the assumptions of Section 2.3, with B = 0, reduces to exactly the same Sharpe ratio at each point
in time as in the case with only one investor.
Asymptotic arbitrage: High-speed natural selection in an asymptotically well-behaved sequence of markets,





N δN. An arbitrage (i.e., self ﬁnanced) portfolio is constructed by borrowing P
 
tΣ
−1(g − rtPt)/CN and
investing it in the portfolio α
def =Λ Σ
−1(g − rtPt)/CN.





































































































for any  >0f o rl a r g eN. Thus, the conditions for asymptotic arbitrage in M are satisﬁed (Ross, 1976).
We stress that, contrary to the partial equilibrium approach of general arbitrage arguments, in our general
equilibrium approach, this is not a scalable asymptotic arbitrage opportunity, as the pricing system is not linear.
For any ﬁxed economy, if the demand for the portfolio is scaled up in an unbounded fashion, the pricing adjusts
and the opportunity to earn abnormal returns diminishes in relative terms.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is a straightforward application of spectral decomposition. The spectral
theorem ensures that for each N, there is a real orthogonal transformation of ΣN into a diagonal matrix with
strictly positive elements, ΣN = R
 




N. W.l.o.g., we can assume that















and by our assumptions, ρN ≤ c2N
−νf(N), δ
 














Proof of Proposition 5: As in the proof of the previous proposition, the spectral theorem ensures that for
each N, there is a real orthogonal transformation of ΣN into a diagonal matrix with strictly positive elements,
ΣN = R
 




N. Moreover, the ﬁrst assumption ensures that there is an





N Q1N). Also, let us denote by PN,t h e









N δN =( δN − PNδN + PNδN)
 Σ
















N Q1N(δN − PNδN) ≥
(δN − PNδN)






















33Proof of Proposition 6: i) Asymptotically well-behaved markets (a.s.): For the Nth market, the market
Sharpe ratio is SN = ρ
√
DN/AN,w h e r eρ is the intertemporal substitution factor, and AN and DN of MN are
deﬁned in Proposition 2. The strong law of large numbers immediately imply that AN →a.s. ¯ p>0, ΔN →a.s.




























i /N →a.s. ¯ β,s oD →a.s. 0+¯ β
2 ∈ (0,∞). Thus, S ∼ 1 a.s.,
AN ∼ 1 a.s., and ΔN ∼ 1 a.s., so the conditions for an asymptotically well-behaved sequence of markets are a.s.
satisﬁed.




N)a n dλN = NδN.W eu s e
the inversion formula (I + xx
 )
−1 = I −
1
1+x xxx
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= k ∈ (0,∞].







Thus, CN grows like kN a.s. as N becomes large. This completes the proof. If E[(α
1
1)
−2] < ∞ (which is not
guaranteed by our assumptions) then k<∞, so in this case the order of the natural selection process is exactly
one. Otherwise it can be faster.
We note that the argument is easy to generalize to more general random structures. For example, a similar
result can be derived for K-factor models, K>1, using the same argument as above, but with the inversion rule
(IN +XX
 )
−1 = IN −X(IK +X
 X)
−1X
 . Here, X is an N ×K random matrix, representing the factor loadings
of the N stocks on K factors, IN is the N × N identity matrix and IK is the K × K identity matrix.
34Short-sales constraints: In the market model of Section 2.2-2.3, high-speed natural selection will not
survive the imposition of nonnegativity constraints for investors’ portfolios. imposing such constraints basically
divides the market into two: one with a subset of stocks in which only the rational investors trade, and the
complement in which only the irrational investors trade. Both groups view the other’s set of stocks as overpriced
and avoid them. The only way to get high-speed natural selection in this case would be through the risk-free
asset, i.e., if the rational investors would be lending to the irrational ones at very high interest rates. However,
an analysis of the constrained optimization problems does not show such behavior, at least not for the market
model of Section 2.2-2.3. In fact, for asymptotically well-behaved sequences of markets, the interest rate will be
bounded, regardless of the number of assets, so high-speed natural selection will not take place.
Thus, with short-sale constraints present, it is not straightforward to achieve high-speed natural selection.
However, if the sequence of markets is not asymptotically well-behaved, it is still possible to achieve high-speed
natural selection. For example, in a growing sequence of markets, the selection process may still be fast. Consider
the following sequence of markets,
gN = 1N, ΣN = IN + 1N1
 
N, (δN)2i =0 .1, (δN)2i+1 = −0.1, (40)
with W10 = W20 =2 . F o rρ = 10%, and large N, this market has a wealth far below the steady state wealth
of ¯ WN = AN/ρ = N/ρ, so consumption and wealth will grow initially. It is straightforward to check, using
equation (38), that the short-selling constraint will not be binding in this case. Moreover, Proposition 5 implies
that high-speed natural selection occurs. Thus, high-speed natural selection survives imposition of short-sale
constraints in this special case. An interpretation of this result is that in rapidly expanding markets, high-speed
natural selection can occur even with short-sale constraints, as in such markets the payoﬀ of ﬁnding the winners
is higher.
Proof of Proposition 7: Identical to the proof of Proposition 3.





−1, which, using (35-36), leads to



























The volume-based measure: From equations (35-36), we have zt =( ( W1t−W2t)1N−2W1tW2tΣ
−1δ)/(2Wt),
via Itˆ o calculus leading to
dzt = −W1tW2tW
−2
t dZ2t1N + W1tW2tW
−2
t ((W1t − W2t)dZ2t − dZ1t)Σ
−1δ + o(dt
1/2).
For convenience, we deﬁne the vector a =Σ









(1NdZ2t +( ( W1t − W2t)dZ2t − dZ1t)a)
  K(1NdZ2t +( ( W1t − W2t)dZ2t − dZ1t)a)+o(dt).
We choose K =Λ S
2Λ, and assume that K is a good preconditioner for Σ
−1, i.e., that KΣ
−1 ≈ IN (see Golub and
van Loan 1991). This is a natural assumption if the idiosyncratic risk of individual stocks are not small. Using











NK1NC +( W1t − W2t)
2C
2 + DC − 2B
2´
+ o(dt),











justifying the approximation (27).
For (28), we note that for small Δt, vt
def =( Δ t)
−1 R t
t−Δt(dzt)i is approximately Normal(0,h
2) distributed for





2Δt + o(Δt), (28) follows.
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